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Abstract: This study examines the association between earnings quality and the cost of 
equity in the United Kingdom (UK) over the time period 2005-2011. This setting and time 
period enables us to examine the effect of IFRS based earnings on the pricing of earnings 
quality and how this relation is influenced by a period of severe macro-economic turbulence 
as in the case of the recent global financial crisis. We find a significant negative association 
between each accounting-based earnings quality proxy considered separately and the cost of 
equity. Our results also indicate that during the financial crisis the relationship between 
earnings quality and cost of equity becomes more prominent than in the pre-crisis period. 
This strengthening of the relationship during a period of macro-economic turbulence shows 
the importance investors place on earnings quality as a measure of risk. Our results also 
document that investors place more importance on the innate component of accruals quality 
than on the discretionary component. These results should be reassuring to US standard 
setters who are considering adopting or converging to IFRS. 
Keywords: earnings quality, accruals quality, the cost of equity, financial crisis. 
1 Introduction                                                                         
The question of whether, how and to what extent earnings quality affects capital market 
resource allocation decisions is fundamental to understanding  why and how accounting 
information matters to investors (Francis et al., 2006). Theoretical work posits that 
information risk is a priced risk factor (Easley and O'hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2012) and 
there is empirical evidence to support this (e.g., Francis et al., 2004; 2005; Verdi, 2006; 
Ogneva, 2012; Gray et al., 2009; McInnis, 2010; Kim and Qi, 2010; Bhattacharya et al., 
2011; García Lara et al., 2011; Barth et al., 2013; Mouselli et al., 2013). 
However, the empirical studies are mainly conducted using US data, which limits the 
generality of their findings vis-à-vis contexts beyond the US. Yet, researchers have reminded 
us of the importance of examining jurisdiction-specific factors in investigating the pricing of 
earnings quality (Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009). This study examines the association 
between earnings quality and the cost of equity in the United Kingdom (UK) over the time 
period 2005-2011.  
Our choices of the UK setting and the time period examined are motivated by two factors. To 
the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first country-specific study that examines the 
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effect of IFRS on the pricing of earnings quality. In addition to examining the relationship 
between earnings attributes and the cost of equity, our study examines whether investors are 
indifferent to the source of information risk in an IFRS setting, which has not to our 
knowledge been examined in prior work. Second, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this 
is the first study to examine the relationship between earnings quality and the cost of capital 
during a period of severe macro-economic turbulence. In the discussion below we expand on 
how these two factors contribute to the literature. 
It is widely accepted that reporting practices are shaped by many external factors, including a 
country’s legal institutions (e.g., the rule of law), the strength of the enforcement regime 
(e.g., auditing), capital market forces (e.g., the need to raise outside capital), ownership and 
governance structure (see Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). 
Nobes (2006) and Ball (2006) argue that despite the adoption of IFRS, these external factors 
will continue to influence reporting choices and Kvaal and Nobes (2010) provide evidence to 
support this. In this respect, the US and the UK share a number of common features, e.g., 
both have a common law system, dispersed ownership, strong investor rights, strong legal 
enforcement and large equity markets (Leuz et al., 2003; Nobes et al., 2008). The two 
countries have also been classified together based on their similarities in prior accounting 
studies (Leuz et al., 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Nobes et al., 2008). However, in spite of 
the similarities between the two countries, there remains one key differentiating factor - the 
use of IFRS in the UK and US GAAP in the US, among publicly traded companies.  
While both US GAAP and IFRS are considered as high quality accounting standards and 
share much in common, there are underlying differences between them (Sun et al., 2011). A 
fundamental difference is that IFRS are principles-based while US GAAP are rules-based and 
more specific than IFRS often requiring the following of more specified prescriptions (Hail et 
al., 2010). Furthermore, there are a number of particular differences between IFRS and US 
GAAP. Most notable is the heavier reliance on fair value accounting and upward asset 
valuations within IFRS, reflecting a stronger equity market focus (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 
2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Wang et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011; Tan et al., 2011; Jiao 
et al., 2012; Horton et al., 2013; Choi et al., 2013; Plumlee and Plumlee, 2008; Hail et al., 
2010). Using the UK as our setting enables us to focus on the effect of IFRS on earnings 
quality and the cost of capital. 
Furthermore, a particular contribution of our study is that we examine how intrinsic and 
discretionary attributes of earnings quality separately influence the cost of capital in an IFRS-
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based setting. US-based research shows that both intrinsic and discretionary attributes are 
priced by the market (Francis et al., 2004; 2005). The broader and less specific principles-
based IFRS can provide management with opportunities for aggressive reporting. However, it 
also provides management with the opportunity to better reflect the economic situation of the 
company and there is a growing body of evidence which indicates that principles-based 
standards lead preparers to issue high quality financial reports (Segovia et al., 2009; Jamal 
and Tan, 2010; Agoglia et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2013). The results of our study should be of 
interest to policy makers in the United States considering adoption or convergence towards 
IFRS (see SEC, 2008).  It provides evidence on whether investors value IFRS earnings in a 
similar fashion to US GAAP earnings. Of particular importance is whether investors 
differentiate between the intrinsic and discretionary component of earnings quality in a 
principles-based accounting system.  
Finally, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to test the association 
between earnings quality and the cost of equity during a period of financial crisis in a country 
with relatively strong fiscal sustainability. While there is a growing body of evidence that 
examines the relationship between earnings quality and the cost of equity, prior research has 
not examined how this relationship is affected by a financial crisis.  Indeed, the effect of 
macro-economic conditions on earnings quality, in general, is an area where there is limited 
work in spite of the large body of evidence in the wider field of earnings management. Filip 
and Raffournier (2014, p.476) note “generally speaking, the consequences of macro-
economic changes in the quality of accounting information are largely unexplored”. In 
general terms, a financial crisis can be defined as an interruption of the normal functioning of 
financial markets. At the beginning of 2008, capital markets around the world suffered from a 
global financial crisis, following the collapse of the US sub-prime mortgage market. The 
crisis formulates for European firms an economic environment characterised by declining 
GDP, lower output, reduced public spending and a lack of liquidity for firms and individuals. 
The crisis had its consequences also in the UK where troubled mortgage providers or banks 
were rescued (Barth and Landsman, 2010; Iqbal and Kume, 2013; Iatridis and Dimitras, 
2013; Kousenidis et al., 2013; Bowen and Khan, 2014; Trombetta and Imperatore, 2014).  
Using firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during the period 2005-2011, we examine 
the association between earnings quality and the cost of equity. Drawing on Francis et al. 
(2004), we use accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability and earnings 
smoothness as our measures of earnings quality. We find a significant negative association 
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between each accounting-based earnings quality proxy considered separately and the cost of 
equity, measured by the earnings-price ratios in relation to their industry peers (IndEP), but 
the exceptions or least consistent associations are found for smoothness. Also, the results 
show that the predictability proxy explains more of the variation in estimates of the cost of 
equity, followed by accruals quality, then persistence, and finally smoothness. Economically, 
the largest impact (earnings predictability) increases the cost of equity by 315 basis points 
(bp) when we move from firms with the best predictability decile to those in the worst decile.  
The results, also, show that the effect on the cost of equity of a unit of innate earnings quality 
is larger in both magnitude and statistical significance than the effect of a unit of 
discretionary earnings quality. In economic terms, the largest effect of the innate accruals 
quality increases the cost of equity by 576 bp between the highest and lowest decile ranks of 
innate accruals, while the similar figure for discretionary accruals quality is only 198 basis 
points. This finding indicates that investors assign far more importance to the innate 
component of earnings than the discretionary component. While these results are in line with 
Francis et al.’s (2004) US study, the effect is more pronounced in our study.  
Our results also indicate that during the financial crisis the relationship between earnings 
quality and cost of equity becomes more prominent than in the pre-crisis period. This 
strengthening of the relationship during a period of macro-economic turbulence shows the 
importance investors place on earnings quality as a measure of risk. We also find that while 
there is a stronger significant association between the innate component and the cost of equity 
in the crisis period than in the pre-crisis period, there is no association between the 
discretionary component and the cost of equity in both periods. This indicates that investors 
are less concerned about discretionary managerial choices than they are about business 
models and the external environment that a company is operating in. This provides evidence 
that investors are less concerned about risk from managerial reporting choices than they are 
about information that reflects the fundamentals of a business. These results should be 
reassuring to US standard setters who are considering adopting or converging to IFRS. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: section (2) discusses the development of the 
hypotheses in the context of a review of prior studies; section (3) outlines sample selection 
and variables measurement; section (4) introduces the main tests and empirical results; 
section (5) concludes the paper.                                                      
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2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
The association between earnings quality and the cost of capital is based on the theory that 
information risk is priced due to either information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors (Easley and O'hara, 2004) or due to the differences in the precision of 
information released by companies (Lambert et al., 2012).  Irrespective of the source, there is 
a general consensus that information risk is non-diversifiable and therefore influences the 
pricing of capital. 
This relationship is supported by a number of empirical papers (e.g., Francis et al., 2004; 
2005; Verdi, 2006; Core et al., 2008; Ogneva, 2012; Gray et al., 2009; McInnis, 2010; Kim 
and Qi, 2010; Bhattacharya et al., 2011; García Lara et al., 2011; Barth et al., 2013; Mouselli 
et al., 2013). The majority of these studies use one proxy to measure earnings quality- the 
most common being accruals quality as a unique proxy for earnings quality (e.g., Francis et 
al., 2005; Core et al., 2008; Ogneva, 2012; Gray et al., 2009; Kim and Qi, 2010).  
Francis et al.’s (2004) seminal work is among the few that uses multiple proxies to 
investigate this relationship. They use seven proxies of earnings quality: accruals quality, 
earnings persistence, earnings predictability, earnings smoothness, value relevance, 
timeliness and conservatism for US firms. Their findings show a statistically significant 
association between each earnings quality proxy considered separately and the cost of equity; 
the exceptions (or least consistent association) were for predictability and conservatism. They 
also find that the accounting-based earnings quality proxies and particularly accruals quality 
explain more of the variation in the cost of equity estimates compared to the market-based 
proxies.  
While the main body of work  focuses on US data, Gray et al. (2009) is among  select 
research that examines a different setting. Using the unique regulatory and institutional 
environment of Australia, they re-examine the association between accruals quality and the 
cost of equity. Their study also lends support to the negative association between accruals 
quality and the cost of equity, though they find that the discretionary portion of accruals does 
not affect the pricing of capital. 
While  most of the studies focus on US data,  researchers have reminded us of the importance 
of examining jurisdiction-specific factor in investigating the pricing of earnings quality 
(Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009). Our study examines the effect of earnings quality and 
the cost of capital using IFRS-based earnings. As discussed in the introduction, while the US 
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and the UK share a number of common institutional features they differ in the use of IFRS 
and US GAAP standards for public listed firms. This provides us with a unique setting to test 
the relationship between IFRS earnings quality and the cost of equity. Prior work in the US 
such as Francis et al. (2004) points toward a negative relationship between earnings quality 
and the cost of capital. While there are a number of similarities, there are also a number of 
fundamental differences between IFRS and US GAAP, which motivates the re-examination 
of this relationship in our study. Given that this is the first study to test this relationship in an 
IFRS setting, we use the results from previous work to specify our hypothesis. To the extent 
that IFRS-based earnings quality capture information risk and is priced by the market, we 
expect to find a relationship that is consistent with prior work.  
H1: firms with high earnings quality have a lower cost of equity compared to firms with poor 
earnings quality.  
Francis et al. (2005) also examine whether the innate and discretionary components of 
accruals quality have different effects on the cost of equity using their sample of US 
companies. Building on the earnings management literature, they posit that earnings quality – 
particularly accruals quality – is influenced by two factors. The first factor, the innate 
component, reflects the business models and operating environments in which a firm 
operates. The second, the discretionary component, reflects managerial choices including 
intentional reporting choices, forecasting errors and implementation errors (Francis et al., 
2005). Their findings show that both the innate component and the discretionary component 
impact the cost of capital. In relation to our sample of UK companies using IFRS accounting 
standards, it is not clear whether the innate and discretionary factors will have similar effects 
on the cost of capital as in previous US studies.  
Gray et al. (2009) re-examine the same association in the Australian market and find that the 
association between total accruals quality and cost of equity is driven by the innate 
component, with no evidence that the discretionary component affects the cost of equity. 
The proponents of IFRS contend that the adoption of IFRS enhances the quality of financial 
reporting compared to using domestic accounting standards (Gassen and Sellhorn, 2006; 
Ding et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010; Iatridis, 2010; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2012; Horton et 
al., 2013). However, this is based on comparisons with domestic standards that are not 
comprehensive compared to US GAAP. In this respect, both IFRS and US GAAP are 
considered high quality accounting standards (Sun et al 2011). Yet they differ fundamentally 
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in that IFRS is a principles-based standard while US GAAP is rules-based. While, the broader 
and less specific principles-based IFRS standards can be seen to provide management with 
opportunities for aggressive reporting, there is a growing body of evidence which suggests 
that principles-based standards lead preparers to issue high quality financial reports (Segovia 
et al., 2009; Jamal and Tan, 2010; Agoglia et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2013). This is attributed 
to greater process accountability under a principles-based system than a rules-based system. 
Agoglia et al. (2011) find that CEO’s are less likely to report aggressive numbers in a 
principles-based regime than in a rules-based regime, as they expect their intentions to be 
second guessed by external parties. Cohen et al. (2013) and Peytcheva et al. (2014) find that 
auditors judgments under principles-based standards lead to more conservative reporting 
when compared to a rules-based standard. Both Cohen et al. (2013) and Peytcheva et al. 
(2014) studies  propose and support a theoretical model in which principles-based accounting 
standards increase auditors’ process accountability— the expectation of having to justify to 
others the decision process used, regardless of the outcome of the decision.  This implies a 
greater monitoring role played by auditors when working with IFRS standards, which in turn 
would mitigate managerial opportunism in financial reporting. Further, using a matched 
sample of cross-listed and US firms, Sun et al. (2011) find that adoption of IFRS led to an 
improvement of earnings quality for a select number of earnings quality measures. 
If investors expect IFRS accounting standards to constrain managerial opportunism they will 
place greater weight on the innate component of earnings quality than on the discretionary 
component. Our second hypothesis therefore is:   
H2. The innate component of earnings quality has a stronger impact on the cost of equity 
compared to the discretionary component. 
 
While there is a growing body of evidence that examines the relationship between earnings 
quality and the cost of equity, prior research has not examined how this relationship is 
affected by a dramatic change in the macro-economic climate. Focusing on earnings 
management, Filip and Raffournier (2014) provide an excellent discussion on why a financial 
crisis may lead to  earnings manipulations but at the same time they also discuss managers 
may not be incentivised to engage in any form of earnings manipulations during a crisis. 
Reasons for upward earnings management include the need to make up for poor operating 
performance during a crisis and to ensure debt covenants are met. Managers may also be 
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motivated to manage earnings downward in a crisis to obtain concessions from debt holders, 
to make them eligible for government subsidies and to mitigate against employee demands. 
On the other, a poor performance is expected during a crisis and companies usually come 
under a higher level of scrutiny from regulators and auditors which means that a crisis period 
may be less favourable to earnings management.  
Existing work in general, points toward an improvement in earnings quality during a crisis 
but the results are not conclusive. Choi et al. (2011) examine effects of the Asian financial 
crisis on earnings quality of nine Asian countries and document an increase in opportunistic 
earnings management. Iatridis and Dimitras (2013) examine the impact of the recent financial 
crisis in 2008-2009 on earnings manipulation and value relevance of firms in five different 
countries, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Greece. In general, they find that countries in 
their sample tend to exhibit higher levels of earnings management in their effort to increase 
their lower profitability and liquidity, and accommodate their higher debt and growth. 
Kousenidis et al. (2013) use the same set of  countries as the previous study of  Iatridis and 
Dimitras (2013) but a larger number of earnings quality proxies. However, their results 
indicate that earnings quality proxies improved during the crisis. These results are also 
supported by Filip and Raffournier (2014) who investigate the impact of the recent financial 
crisis on earnings management using a sample of 16 EU countries. They conclude that 
earnings management has decreased significantly in the crisis years compared with the 
previous years, though this trend does not apply equally across all countries in the sample.  
Francis et al. (2013) focus on a different angle and examine the association between 
conservatism and shareholder value during the recent financial crisis using a sample of US 
companies. They find that there is a significant positive association between conservatism 
and shareholder value indicating the importance that investors place on risk averse 
accounting choices during a downturn in economic conditions.   
Prior research, however, has not investigated the association between earnings quality and the 
cost of equity during a dramatic change in the economic climate as was the case in the recent 
financial crisis of 2008-2009. Our study examines whether the financial crisis affects the 
association between earnings quality and the cost of equity. Based on prior evidence that 
examines earnings management, we expect the financial crisis to have an impact on the 
association between earnings quality and the cost of equity; however; we do not specify a 
particular direction to this relationship. Therefore given the mixed evidence, we examine the 
following hypothesis: 
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H3: the financial crisis has a significant effect on the association between earnings quality 
and the cost of equity. 
 
3 Methodology and sample selection 
3.1 Earnings Quality proxies  
We focus on four accounting-based earnings quality proxies; accruals quality, earnings 
persistence, earnings predictability and earnings smoothness (see Francis et al., 2004). These 
proxies demonstrate different angles of earnings quality (Francis et al., 2004; Dechow et al., 
2010; Walker, 2013). The accruals quality proxy reflects the extent to which working capital 
accruals map into last-period, current, and next-period cash flow from operations (Dechow 
and Dichev, 2002). A stronger association between accruals and cash flow from operations is 
considered indicative of high earnings quality. Earnings persistence reflects the extent to 
which earnings are stable and, sustainable as less volatile earnings are valued by investors 
(Francis et al., 2004; Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2014). The more sustainable the earnings, the 
higher the quality of earnings.  Similar to earnings persistence, earnings predictability reflects 
the extent to which current earnings are useful in predicting future earnings. This is based on 
the notion that an earnings number that is likely to repeat itself is of high quality. So, both  
earnings persistence and predictability are viewed as desired proxies of earnings quality  
because it helps increasing the precision of earnings forecasts (Francis et al., 2006).  
It is not clear whether the final proxy - earnings smoothness represents high or low earnings 
quality (Dechow et al., 2010; Dichev et al., 2013). The common view is that earnings 
smoothness reflects managers using their private information about future income to smooth 
out transitory fluctuations, and thus achieve a more representative (normalized) reported 
earnings number. Therefore, current earnings that are more representative of future earnings, 
are of higher quality; thus, smoother earnings reflects  higher quality earnings (Francis et al., 
2006; Rountree et al., 2008). However, some argue that smoothness misleads users, as the 
true economic performance is veiled (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003). They argue that earnings 
smoothness reflects the extent to which financial accounting standards permit managers to 
artificially reduce earnings variability, to obtain certain benefits from the capital market, 
which are that related to a smooth stream of earnings (Leuz et al., 2003). According to this 
view, high earnings smoothness would indicate poorer earnings quality. The next sub-
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sections discuss in detail the measurements of each of the accounting-based earnings quality 
proxies. 
3.1.1 Accruals quality 
Accruals quality is measured as the extent to which accruals map into cash flow realizations. 
This is  operationalized as the standard deviation of the residuals from firm-specific 
regressions of working capital accruals on previous-year, current, and one-year-ahead cash 
flow from operations (Dechow and Dichev, 2002, p.53). Our measure is based on Francis et 
al. (2005) who use McNichols (2002) modification of Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach 
to estimate accruals quality. Two additional variables from the modified Jones model, i.e., 
change in revenues and current property, plant and equipment (PPE) are included in the 
McNichols (2002) modification. Our model is therefore  different from that used in the study 
of Francis et al. (2004), who do not make any modifications to the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model. Accruals quality is calculated as follows:  
 ܶܥܣ௖.௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௖,௧ ൌ 	ߙ଴,௖ ൅ ߚଵ,௖
ܥܨܱ௖,௧ିଵ
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௖,௧ ൅ ߚଶ,௖
ܥܨܱ௖,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௖,௧ ൅ ߚଷ,௖
ܥܨܱ௖,௧ାଵ
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௖,௧
൅ ߚସ,௖ ∆ܴ݁ݒ௖,௧ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௖,௧ ൅ ߚହ,௖
ܲܲܧ௖,௧
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௖,௧ ൅ ݒ௖,௧ 
Eq ( 1 ) 
 
 
Where: 
ܶܥܣ௖.௧ ൌ 	∆ܥܣ௖,௧ െ	∆ܥܮ௖,௧ െ ∆ܥܽݏ݄௖,௧ ൅	∆ܵܶܦܧܤ ௖ܶ,௧= total current accruals in year t. 
ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௖,௧= average total assets of firm c in year t and t-1. 
ܥܨܱ௖.௧ ൌ	operating cash flow of firm c in year t. 
∆ܥܣ௖,௧= change in current assets of firm c between year t-1 and year t. 
∆ܥܮ௖,௧= change in current liabilities of firm c between year t-1 and year t. 
∆ܥܽݏ݄௖,௧= change in cash of firm c between year t-1 and year t. 
∆ܵܶܦܧܤܶܣ௖,௧= change in debt in current liabilities of firm c between year t-1 and year t. 
∆ܴ݁ݒ௖,௧= change in revenues of firm c between year t-1 and year t. 
ܲܲܧ௖,௧= gross PPE of firm c in year t. 
Equation (1) is estimated for each 14 industry sectors with at least 12 firms in year t. Firm 
and year-specific residuals for the accruals quality proxy are estimated on an annual cross-
sectional basis: ܣܳ௖ ൌ 	ߪ	ሺݒ௖,௧ሻ is the standard deviation of the residuals of firm c, computed 
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over year t-4 to t.  Large standard deviations of residuals indicate poor accruals quality. In 
this regard, if a firm has steadily high residuals for a period of time, the standard deviation of 
these residuals will be small; therefore, the firm will enjoy comparatively high accruals 
quality as a result of lower uncertainty about its accruals (Francis et al., 2005). 
3.1.2 Earnings persistence 
Earnings persistence refers to the sustainability of earnings, Miller and Rock (1985) define 
persistence as the present value of the change in expected future earnings because of current 
unexpected earnings. Earnings persistence is measured as the slope coefficient from   
regressing current earnings on previous earnings (Francis et al., 2004; Richardson et al., 
2005) and calculated as follows:  
 ܧܽݎ݊௖,௧ ൌ 	∅଴,௖ ൅	∅ଵ,௖ ∗ 	ܧܽݎ݊௖,௧ିଵ ൅	ݒ௖,௧ Eq ( 2 ) 
Where: 
ܧܽݎ݊௖,௧ = net income before extraordinary items of firm c in year t. 
ܧܽݎ݊௖,௧ିଵ = net income before extraordinary items of firm c in year t-1. 
Equation (2) is estimated for each firm-year by using maximum likelihood estimations and 
rolling ten-year windows. This measure is based on the slope coefficient estimate (∅ଵ) from 
equation (2). A firm with a higher value of ∅ଵ is associated with  higher earnings persistence 
and  hence a higher earnings quality, while a lower value of ∅ଵ is associated with  higher 
transitory earnings and poorer earnings quality (Francis et al., 2004). 
3.1.3 Earnings predictability  
According to the IASB Framework, Information has "predictive value" if it helps users to 
predict future outcomes e.g. future financial performance. (Melville, 2008). Lipe (1990) 
defines predictability as the ability of preceding earnings to predict future earnings, and 
measures earnings predictability as the variability of earnings shocks (as variance increases, 
the predictability decreases). Our study measures earnings predictability as the square root of 
the estimated error variance using values calculated from earnings persistence in Equation (2) 
(Francis et al. (2004). 
 
ܲݎ݁݀௖,௧ ൌ ටߪଶሺݒො௖,௧ሻ Eq ( 3 ) 
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Where: 
ܲݎ݁݀௖,௧= earnings predictability of firm c in year t, calculated as the square root of the error 
variance from earnings persistence equation (Equation (2)); ߪଶሺݒො௖,௧ሻ= the error variance of 
firm c in year t calculated from earnings persistence equation. Thus, a higher (lower) square 
root of the estimated error variance, indicates a lower (higher) of predictability and a lower 
(higher) of earnings quality. To sum up, earnings predictability is considered as a function of 
the average absolute magnitude of annual earnings shocks, while earnings persistence reflects 
the autocorrelation in earnings (Lipe, 1990). 
3.1.4 Earnings smoothness 
Our study measures earnings smoothness as the ratio of standard deviation of earnings of a 
firm  to its standard deviation of cash flow operations, both deflated by beginning total assets 
(Pincus and Rajgopal, 2002; Leuz et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2004) as captured in Equation 
(4). 
 ܵ݉݋݋ݐ݄௖,௧
ൌ ߪሺܧܽݎ݊௖,௧/ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௖,௧ିଵሻ ߪሺܥܨܱ௖,௧/ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௖,௧ିଵሻ⁄  
Eq ( 4 ) 
Where: 
ܵ݉݋݋ݐ݄௖,௧ is earnings smoothness of firm c in year t. 
ߪ is the standard deviation of firm c calculated over rolling ten-year windows. 
ܧܽݎ݊௖,௧ is the net income before extraordinary items of firm c in year t. 
ܥܨܱ௖,௧  is the operating cash flows of firm c in year t.  
Hence, firms with higher ratios have a lower earnings smoothness indicative of poor earnings 
quality. 
To compare coefficient estimates across earnings quality proxies, we rank each proxy by year 
and form deciles. Firms in the bottom decile (decile 10) have the largest values of the proxy 
while firms in the top decile (decile 1) have the lowest values of the proxy. Given the 
definitions of our proxy measures, this ordering places firms with the worst (best) outcome 
for the proxy in the bottom (top) deciles. Earnings persistence is resigned to be in the same 
direction as the other three earnings quality proxies. Using the decile rank of each proxy 
instead of its raw value alleviates the effects of extreme observations (Francis et al., 2004; 
2005). 
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3.2 The cost of equity capital  
We use the earnings-price ratio as our main proxy for the cost of capital and five implied (ex-
ante) measures of the cost of equity derived from dividend valuation model as part of our 
robustness tests. 
3.2.1  Earnings-price ratios 
The earnings-price ratio is a widely used measure in the investment community and has 
support in the academic literature. We follow Penman (2007) who uses the price-earnings 
ratio as an inverse measure of the cost of equity to examine whether higher earnings quality 
leads to a higher price-earnings ratio. Kothari (2001) provides evidence that earnings 
capitalisation models explain cross-sectional variation in prices as much as more rigorous 
residual income valuation models. Following this line of research, the earnings-price ratio is 
commonly used in academic work as a proxy for the cost of equity capital (Francis et al., 
2005; Gray et al., 2009; Liu and Wysocki, 2008). Furthermore in relation to our sample, an 
advantage of using the earnings-price ratio in the UK, is that it allows us to work with a 
larger sample size. The use of the implied/ex-ante cost of equity estimates require the use of 
analyst forecasts but since analysts generally follow larger firms, this significantly restricts 
the available sample size. Nevertheless, implied/ex-ante cost of equity estimates are also used 
as part of our robustness tests. 
We follow Alford (1992) and calculate industry-adjusted earnings-price ratios in order to 
match firms to industry growth and risk factors (Francis et al. 2005). The association between 
each earnings quality proxy and industry-adjusted earnings–price ratios (IndEP) is examined. 
To calculate IndEP, we first calculate the median of earnings-price ratio for all firms which 
have positive earnings in the year examined for each of the 14 industry sectors. Thereafter, 
the ܫ݊݀ܧܲ of each firm is calculated as the difference between the earnings-price ratio of the 
firm and the median earnings price ratio of the  industry sector  the firm belongs to in that 
year. If investors attribute lower multiples due to of lower earnings quality, larger IndEP 
values are expected.  
3.2.2 The implied cost of equity capital proxies 
Since the  cost of equity is a forward-looking concept based on expected cash flows, it is not 
directly observable (Singleton-Green, 2014). Therefore, this research extends the literature by 
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computing the expected cost of equity through the application of recent methods of 
accounting and finance literature in the robustness check section.  
Prior research on this topic relies primarily on IndEP as one proxy to calculate the cost of 
capital. In order to improve the robustness of our results, we estimate five other measures of 
the cost of capital, derived as an implied rate of return from the classic dividend valuation 
model. The five ex-ante measures are price earnings growth ratio model (PEG) (Easton, 
2004); the modified PEG model (Easton, 2004); the economy-wide growth model (Ohlson 
and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005); and the modified economy-wide growth model (Gode and 
Mohanram, 2003). In order to reduce bias and measurement errors in the regression analysis 
(Hail and Leuz, 2006), we use the average of the four measures as a proxy for the cost of 
equity. Figure (1) shows the formulae for these proxies. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
3.3 Control variables 
The hypothesised association between earnings quality and the cost of equity is based on the 
assumption that other variables are held constant. Based on prior studies, we include four 
control variables in our regression model (Francis et al., 2005; Core et al., 2008; Gray et al., 
2009). These are firm size, beta (CAPM), leverage and growth. We measure firm size as a log 
of total assets in year t. Beta (CAPM) is based on a 5-year rolling data acquired from firm-
specific CAPM estimations using monthly data; it requires a firm to have at least 20 monthly 
observations. Leverage is measured as total interest bearing debt divided by total assets in 
year t. Finally, growth is measured as the log of 1 plus the percentage change in the book 
value of equity over the preceding 5 years (Francis et al., 2005; Core et al., 2008; Gray et al., 
2009). We expect a positive associations between the cost of equity and both beta and 
leverage (Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009), and negative associations between the cost 
of equity and both firm size and growth (Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009). 
3.4 Data 
Our sample covers all non-financial firms in the London Stock Exchange during the period 
2005-2011. In order to avoid any survivorship bias, we include both active and dead equities 
in our sample. We use Thomson Reuters DataStream database for earnings quality proxies 
and industry-adjusted earnings–price ratios (IndEP). Also, we use the I/B/E/S Database for 
the implied cost of equity proxies which we use for our robustness tests. Our sample is 
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restricted by two factors: (1) each firm requires at least 7 consecutive years of data because 
accruals quality is calculated as the standard deviation of 5 consecutive annual residuals,  
both lead and lag cash flows are also required in the accruals quality regression (see Equation 
(1)). (2) Data on all four proxies of earnings quality are required to be available for each firm-
year.  In total, there are 4,214 firm-year observations. The number of firm’s each year ranges 
between 565 per year to 630 per year. The number of industries is 14 industries, Table (1) 
Panel (A) reports the number of firms per industry for each year. Along with the prior studies, 
the outliers of all variables are winsorised to the 1st and 99th percentiles (Francis et al., 2005). 
4 Empirical tests and results 
4.1 Descriptive results 
Panel B of table (1) reports descriptive statistics regarding the earnings quality proxies, 
IndEP and firm characteristics for the pooled sample. The mean of accruals quality (AQ) is 
0.08 and median is 0.06; as a benchmark, Francis et al. (2004) provide mean and median 
values of 0.028 and 0.020. For persistence, the mean and median are 0.32 and 0.29 
respectively and Francis et al. (2004) provide mean and median values of 0.482 and 0.520 
respectively. For predictability, the figures are 0.74 and 0.074 respectively. In comparison, 
Francis et al. (2004) provide mean and median values of earnings predictability as 0.876 and 
0.536 respectively. Finally, the mean and median of earnings smoothness are 1.12 and 1.03 
respectively, while, Francis et al. (2004) provide mean and median values of earnings 
smoothness as 0.640 and 0.578.  
Panel B also reports summary information of relevant financial variables. The mean of total 
assets is £1,633 million and the median of total assets is £127 million; mean sales is £1,260 
million and median sales is £141 million. The mean and median of market value of equity are 
£1,273 million and £107 million respectively. 
Panel C of table (1) reports the correlations among IndEP, earnings quality proxies, and the 
control variables. While there is a significant and positive correlation among the four 
earnings quality proxies, the correlations do not exceed 0.3 indicating that the earnings 
quality proxies are distinct with each measure reflecting a different dimension of earnings 
quality. This finding is consistent with prior studies that document low empirical correlations 
among these proxies of earnings quality (Francis et al., 2004; Bowen et al., 2008; Dechow et 
al., 2010).  
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The results show significant positive correlations between IndEP and all the four earnings 
quality proxies as well as the control variables, beta and leverage. Also, there is a significant 
negative correlation between IndEP and firm size which is consistent with prior literature. 
However, there is no significant correlation between IndEP and firm growth. The correlations 
among earnings quality proxies and the control variables range between 0.04 and 0.46 which 
indicates a lack of multicollinearity among the independent variables. We also calculate 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs). VIFs above ten are thought to indicate severe 
multicollinearity problems (Field, 2005). The results show none of the VIFs are above two, 
which suggests that multicollinearity does not pose a problem to our subsequent regression 
analyses. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4.2 Empirical tests 
Panel D Table (1) provides results of our univariate analysis of the IndEP across quintiles 
sorted on each EQ proxy from the lowest to the highest. It presents information on the 
difference between the mean of the cost of equity and both the poor and the high earnings 
quality quintiles. It reports that firms with poor earnings quality quintile (Q10) have a 
significant larger mean ܫ݊݀ܧܲ compared to firms with high earnings quality quintile (Q1), 
except for earnings smoothness which shows no significant difference between the two said 
quintiles. In terms of accruals quality, the difference between mean ܫ݊݀ܧܲ values of the two 
quintiles (Q10 and Q1) is 0.039 and significantly different from zero (t-statistic 5.66). For 
persistence, the difference between mean ܫ݊݀ܧܲ values of the two said quintiles is 0.015 and 
is significantly different from zero (t-statistic 2.94). For predictability, the difference between 
mean ܫ݊݀ܧܲ values of the two said quintiles is 0.050 and is significantly different from zero 
(t-statistic 6.21). Finally, for smoothness, the difference between mean ܫ݊݀ܧܲ values of the 
two said quintiles is -0.0064 but not significantly different from zero (t-statistic 1.20). 
4.2.1 The association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital 
In this section, we present the results of the main tests. We examine the associations between 
the cost of equity and each earnings quality proxies for each year t using equation (5).  
 ܫ݊݀ܧ ௖ܲ,௧ ൌ 	 ߲଴ ൅ ߲ଵܤ݁ݐܽ௖,௧ ൅ ߲ଶܵ݅ݖ݁௖,௧ ൅ ߲ଷܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௖,௧ ൅ ߲ସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௖,௧
൅ ߲ହܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௖,௧௞ ൅ ߜ௖,௧ Eq ( 5 ) 
Where: 
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ܤ݁ݐܽ is the five years rolling pre-estimated beta acquired from CAPM estimates using 
monthly data; it involves no less than 20 monthly returns for each firm to do this estimation; 
ܵ݅ݖ݁ is log of firm c’s total assets in year t, 
ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄ is the log of one plus the firm’s growth in book value of equity over the preceding 5 
years; 
ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ is a firm c’s interest-bearing debt deflated by total assets in year t; 
ܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௖,௧௞  is the decile rank of firm c's value of the kth earnings quality proxy in year t, 
ܭ ∈ ሼܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏܳݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ, ܲ݁ݎݏ݅ݏݐ݁݊ܿ݁, ܲݎ݁݀݅ܿݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ, ܵ݉݋݋ݐ݄݊݁ݏݏሽ. 
Based on prior work, we expect a positive coefficient on the earnings quality decile rank, 
indicating that investors attach higher risk assessments to stocks with less favourable (i.e., 
larger) values of each earnings quality proxy and therefore a higher cost of equity for the 
firm. For the control variables, we expect positive coefficients for CAPM beta and leverage, 
as high-risk companies financed with larger proportions of debt are expected to have a higher 
cost of equity. By contrast, the literature suggests that the coefficients for company size and 
growth should be positive since large companies or high growth companies can typically 
raise equity funds more cheaply. Moreover, to alleviate concerns about cross-sectional 
dependencies in the sample, we estimate Equation (5) for each of the 7 years in the sample by 
using the time-series standard errors regressions introduced by Fama and MacBeth (1973). 
Also, Newey and West (1987) standard errors pooled regression is used, which controls 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation effects, to assess the sensitivity of  the previous results. 
Table (2) provides the time-series standard errors regressions results (Column 1) and pooled 
regression results (Column 2) for Equation (5) for each earnings quality proxy. Predictability 
has the largest effect on the cost of equity, with a mean coefficient estimate of 0.0035 (t-
statistic =6.46). This finding shows that firms with a lower earnings predictability have a 
higher cost of equity compared to firms with higher earnings predictability. The second 
largest cost of equity effect is observed for accruals quality, the results show a mean 
coefficient estimate of 0.0024 (t-statistic = 5.45). This finding shows that firms with a lower 
accruals quality have a higher cost of equity relative to firms with higher accruals quality. 
The third largest effect is observed for persistence, with a mean estimate of coefficient 0.0014 
(t-statistic=3.19). Finally, the results show a significant association between earnings 
smoothness and the cost of equity, with a mean estimate of coefficient 0.0008 (t-statistic = 
2.95).  
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Economically, the results show that firms with high earnings predictability enjoy a 315 
(coefficient 0.0035 times 9 decile differences) basis point lower cost of equity compared to 
firms with poor earnings predictability. For accruals quality, the results show a 216 difference 
basis point between firms with high and poor accruals quality. For persistence, the results 
show a 126 difference basis point between firms with high and poor earnings persistence. 
Finally for smoothness, the results show a 72 difference basis point between firms with high 
and poor earnings smoothness. While there are differences in the ranking of the proxies, our 
results are generally consistent with prior findings reported by Francis et al. (2004); (2005) 
and Grey et al (2009). As the quality of earnings declines, the amount that investors are ready 
to pay for a pound of earnings declines as well, implying a higher cost of equity for such 
firms. This supports the conjecture of hypothesis (1). 
In terms of control variables, results show that ܫ݊݀ܧܲ is negatively associated with both 
Growth1 and Size, consistent with prior literature, firms with high growth rates have lower 
earnings–price ratios and larger firms have a lower cost of equity. Finally, the results show a 
positive association between IndEP and both Beta2 and Leverage consistent with the prior 
work (Francis et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2009). 
Further, Newey and West (1987) standard errors pooled regression is used. Table (2) 
(Column 2) reports the coefficient estimate and statistical significance of each earnings 
quality pooled regression for the same sample. The pooled results are similar to the results of  
the Fama and MacBeth (1973) mean annual regressions, except for the  following  (1) the 
association between IndEP and smoothness becomes insignificant. (2) The associations 
between IndEP and both Beta and Growth becomes significant. (3) The effect of persistence 
on the cost of equity has a significantly larger effect than accruals quality. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2.2 The innate and discretionary earnings quality effects on the cost of equity capital 
Following Francis et al. (2005), we disentangle between the innate and the discretionary 
components of total earnings quality. We use five summary indicators to compute the effects 
of the operating environment and business model that represent the innate component: firm 
size, the standard deviation of cash flows for preceding 10 years, the standard deviation of 
                                                 
1 The negative relationship between Growth and IndEP is insignificant at 10% significant level except in AQ 
regression, which the relation is significant at 5% significant level. 
2 The positive relationship between Beta and IndEP is insignificant at 10% significant level. 
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sales for preceding 10 years, the length of operating cycle, and the frequency of negative 
realised earnings for preceding 10 years. This method uses the predicted values estimated 
from regressing earnings quality proxy on these summary indicators to compute the innate 
portion of earnings quality proxy, and the residual from this regression represents the 
discretionary portion (see Equation 6).  
 ܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௖,௧௞ ൌ 	 ߣ଴,௖ ൅ ߣଵ,௖ܵ݅ݖ݁௖,௧ ൅ ߣଶ,௖ߪሺܥܨܱሻ௖,௧ ൅ ߣଷ,௖ߪሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ௖,௧
൅ ߣସ,௖ܱ݌݁ݎܥݕ݈ܿ݁௖,௧ ൅ ߣହ,௖ܰ݁݃ܧܽݎ݊௖,௧ ൅ ݒ௖,௧ 
Eq ( 6 ) 
Where:  
ߪሺܥܨܱሻ௖,௧ is the standard deviation of firm c’s cash flow operations computed through the 
preceding 10 years, ߪሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ௖,௧ is the standard deviation of firm c’s net revenue computed 
through the preceding 10 years, ܱ݌݁ݎܥݕ݈ܿ݁௖,௧ the log of firm c’s operating cycle in year t, 
ܰ݁݃ܧܽݎ݊௖,௧ the number of years where firm c reported net income before extraordinary 
items (NIBE) < 0 out of the preceding 10 years. The predicted value of ܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௖,௧௄  
represents the innate earnings quality, and the residual ሺݒ௖,௧ሻ represents the discretionary 
earnings quality. Using the coefficient estimates acquired from the annual regressions of 
equation (6), we calculate the innate earnings quality and the discretionary earnings quality, 
then we replace total earnings quality in the main model (Equation 5) with those two 
components.  
Table (3) reports that the innate component coefficient is larger than the discretionary 
component coefficient by a factor of two for all earnings quality proxies and also exhibits 
stronger statistical significance than the discretionary coefficient. Moreover, the results also 
show a significant association between IndEP and the innate portion of smoothness and 
insignificant association between IndEP and the discretionary portion of smoothness.  
In economic terms, the largest effect of the innate accruals quality increases the cost of equity 
by 576 basis points between highest and lowest decile rank of the innate accruals quality 
firms, while the effect of the discretionary accruals quality is 198 basis points. This result 
suggests that investors give greater weight to the innate component which is driven by 
economic fundamentals, compared to the discretionary component that is driven by 
management choices in the UK when determining the cost of equity of a firm. While Francis 
et al. (2004) also find that investors place higher importance on innate factors, our findings 
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are more pronounced. This supports the conjecture in our second hypothesis that applying 
IFRS in the UK increases the quality and precision of accounting information and reduces 
information asymmetry for both future cash flow and future earnings, thus the information 
risk that associated with the discretionary earnings quality is reduced.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.2.3 The financial crisis 
We classify the sample period (2005-2011) into three sub-periods: ‘pre-crisis period’ for 
years 2005, 2006 and 2007, ‘crisis period’ for years 2008 and 2009, and ‘recovery period’ for 
years 2010 and 2011. Figure (2) presents the mean of IndEP each year from 2005 to 2011. It 
shows that the mean of IndEP increased steadily from the pre-crisis years (2005, 2006 and 
2007) to the  crisis years (2008 and 2009) and then  decreased in the post-crisis years (2010 
and 2011). We test the interaction effect between earnings quality and the financial crisis on 
the cost of equity using equation (7).  
 ܫ݊݀ܧ ௖ܲ,௧ ൌ 	 ߲଴ ൅ ߲ଵܤ݁ݐܽ௖,௧ ൅ ߲ଶܵ݅ݖ݁௖,௧ ൅ ߲ଷܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௖,௧ ൅ ߲ସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௖,௧
൅ ߲ହܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௖,௧௞ ൅ ߲଺ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௖,௧ ൅ ߲଻ܴ݁ܿ݋ݒ݁ݎݕ௖,௧
൅ ଼߲ܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௖,௧௞ ∗ ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௖,௧ ൅ ߲ଽܧܳܲݎ݋ݔݕ௖,௧௞ ∗ ܴ݁ܿ݋ݒ݁ݎݕ௖,௧൅ߜ௖,௧ 
Eq ( 7 ) 
Where: 
ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௖,௧ is a dummy variable equals 1 if years are 2008 and 2009 and equals zero otherwise; 
ݎ݁ܿ݋ݒ݁ݎݕ௖,௧ is a dummy variable equals 1 if years are 2010 and 2011 and equals zero 
otherwise. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results are reported in Table (4). The results indicate that, during the crisis, the 
relationship between the cost of equity and earnings quality becomes stronger. The slope 
coefficient of accruals quality in the pre-crisis period is 0.0026, however during the crisis, the 
value of this slope coefficient had risen to 0.0136 (0.0026+0.011), reflecting the higher 
sensitivity of the cost of equity to accruals quality during the crisis. This supports the 
conjecture of our third hypothesis. However, the strength of this association decreases after 
the crisis period. The results, also, show that during the crisis, investors place more attention 
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on earnings sustainability and the change in expected future earnings than on the relationship 
between earnings and cash flow of firms. 
We also test the interaction effects between both the innate and discretionary earnings quality 
components and the financial crisis on the cost of equity capital. The results indicate that in 
both periods, the pre-crisis and the crisis period, there is strong evidence that the innate 
accruals quality is priced, whereas the discretionary component has insignificant pricing 
effects. Table (5) reports the results.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.3 Robustness check 
We perform a number of sensitivity tests on our results. In addition to IndEP, we use five 
other ex-ante measures for the cost of equity, derived from the following dividend valuation 
models; the price-earnings growth ratio model (PEG) (Easton, 2004), the modified price-
earnings growth ratio (Easton, 2004), the economy-wide growth model (Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth, 2005), the modified economy-wide growth model (Gode and Mohanram, 2003), and  
the mean of the four proxies (ݎ௉ாீ, ݎெ௉ாீ, ݎ௢௝௡, ீݎ ெ) to reduce biases and measurement errors 
in the regression analysis (Hail and Leuz, 2006). All of these proxies are used as alternatives 
to the IndEP. Equation (5) is re-tested by replacing IndEP with the five ex-ante measures of 
the cost of equity (results reported in table (6) panel A-B). We find similar results to the main 
tests with higher R2 compared to using IndEP. We also use the ratio of firms E/P to median 
Industry E/P as a measure of the cost of equity and re-test Equation (5) (results not reported). 
We find a significant negative association between each earnings quality proxy and the cost 
of equity in line with our main results. 
As part of our further robustness tests, we use panel regressions with fixed and random 
effects for IndEP. In addition, we use the Hausman test to differentiate between the fixed 
effects and the random effects model. We test the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the coefficients estimated 
by the consistent fixed effects estimator. The results indicate a rejection of the null 
hypothesis; this suggests that fixed effects estimations are more appropriate than random 
effects estimations. Table (7) reports the results. We find a significant negative association 
between each earnings quality proxy and IndEP. The largest effect on the cost of equity is 
observed for predictability then accruals quality then persistence and smoothness, consistent 
with the main results. 
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Third, following Francis et al. (2005), we partition the total earnings quality into the innate 
and discretionary component using an alternative method. This involves adding the summary 
indicator variables that represent the innate portion to the cost of equity regression model as 
control variables. The variables are firm Size, ߪሺܥܨܱሻ, ߪሺ݈ܵܽ݁ݏሻ, ܱ݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݊݃	ܥݕ݈ܿ݁, and 
ܰ݁݃ܧܽݎ݊. Therefore,  the coefficient estimate of earnings quality represents the effect of the 
discretionary portion of earnings quality on the cost of equity (Francis et al., 2005). Table (8) 
reports the results. We find that the discretionary component has a negligible effect on the 
cost of equity. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
5 Discussion and conclusion 
Empirical evidence that examines the association between earnings quality and the cost of 
equity supports theoretical work that information risk is a non-diversifiable risk factor. 
However, the main body of evidence, centred on Francis et al.’s (2004) seminal work, 
focuses on earnings quality measures that are based on US GAAP. This study extends the 
analysis of Francis et al. (2004) for a sample of UK listed firms during the period 2005 to 
2011. The UK is selected because it has a similar institutional setting to the United States but 
differs in the use of IFRS. Our study also investigates the interplay between earnings quality 
and the cost of capital during a period of severe macro-economic turbulence.  
Using a sample of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during the period 2005-2011, 
we calibrate our four accounting-based earnings quality proxies (accruals quality, persistence, 
predictability and smoothness) against the cost of equity. We examine whether each proxy 
matters to investors, and which proxy is viewed by investors as conferring the greatest capital 
market advantage, as measured by a decreased cost of equity.  
Our empirical results are consistent across estimation methods (annual regressions and 
pooled regressions) and proxies of the cost of equity (IndEP and the implied measures). We 
generally find a statistically significant negative association between each earnings proxy 
considered separately and the cost of equity consistent with our first hypothesis. 
However, unlike Francis et al. (2004), our results show that the predictability proxy explains 
more of the variation in estimates of the cost of equity, followed by accruals quality, then 
persistence, and finally smoothness. Moreover, while Francis et al. (2004) find that investors 
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reward smoother earnings streams, with a reduced cost of equity, we do not find any 
association or least consistent association between the cost of equity and earnings 
smoothness. Consistent with our second hypothesis, our results also show that the innate 
component of each earnings quality proxy has a larger impact on the cost of equity than the 
discretionary component. While this is consistent with Francis et al. (2004), the effect of the 
innate component on the cost of equity is more pronounced in our study.  
The interaction effect between earnings quality and the financial crisis on the cost of equity is 
also examined. The results indicate that the association between earnings quality and the cost 
of equity is stronger in the crisis than in the pre-crisis period. Also, we investigate the 
interaction effect between the two components of earnings quality – the innate and the 
discretionary components – and the financial crisis on the cost of equity. We find that the the 
innate component has a stronger impact on the cost of equity in the crisis period than the pre-
crisis; however, we find no significant association between the discretionary component and 
the cost of equity in both period. 
Explaining this finding may need to recognize that when the economy is stable because 
investment opportunities are numerous, investors perhaps pay less attention to the quality of 
accounting information (Mitton, 2002). Conversely, a crisis could force investors to identify 
the weakness in the quality of accounting information that existed all along. This 
identification may lead to a ‘‘flight-to-quality’’ syndrome (e.g., Goh et al., 2009; Francis et 
al., 2012). This leads investors to either withdraw from the stock market completely or move 
their investments to what they consider as firms with high quality accounting information 
(Francis et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2013).  
There are a number of implications that derive from the results of our study. First, more 
generally, our study consistent with prior work in the field shows that quality matters and 
customers (investors) are willing to pay for it. More specifically to the best of our knowledge, 
our empirical findings are the first to document that information risk as measured by earnings 
quality is priced in a setting that uses IFRS for reporting practices. Our study is also the first 
to document that this relationship becomes even stronger during a period of macro-economic 
turbulence.  
While our main results are similar to Francis et al. (2004), our findings differ in the rankings 
accorded to the different earnings quality proxies. We find that predictability is ranked as the 
most significant earnings quality proxy while Francis et al. (2004) do not find a significant 
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relationship between predictability and the cost of equity. Given the inclination of IFRS 
towards fair value reporting and principles-based standards, the results give insights into the 
importance investors place on predicting future performance using current earnings in this 
setting.  
Our results also show that in an IFRS-based setting; investors are less concerned about the 
discretionary portion of earnings than they are about earnings quality that reflects the 
fundamentals of a business.  This relationship becomes even more important during a period 
of macro-economic turbulence. Furthermore, unlike Francis et al. (2004), our results show 
that investors are indifferent to earnings smoothing driven by discretionary factors but price  
earnings smoothing factors driven by innate factors . Taken together these results should be 
comforting to US standard setters who are considering adopting IFRS as it provides evidence 
that investors are less concerned about managerial opportunism when principles-based 
accounting standards are used to calculate earnings. 
A limitation of our study is that we do not address reverse causality concerns, as firms with a 
lower cost of equity may have more resources to improve earnings quality3. This is an area 
that future research can address. Moreover, future work can also examine how earnings 
quality affects the cost of debt in an IFRS setting. Finally, reiterating the analysis to other 
geographical locations with varying institutional structures will provide us with better global 
insights into the relation between earnings quality and the cost of capital.  
  
                                                 
3 We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this issue. 
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Figure 1 
Formulae for the implied cost of equity capital models 
The cost of equity proxy The proxy symbol Formula 
Price earnings growth ratio model 
(PEG) (Easton, 2004) ݎ௉ாீ  
ݎ௉ாீ ൌ 	ඨܧሺ݁݌ݏ୲ାଶሻ െ ܧሺ݁݌ݏ୲ାଵሻ୲ܲ  
݁݌ݏ௧= earnings per share at the period t 
௧ܲ = price of the share at period t. The modified price-earnings-
growth ratio model (Easton, 2004) 
ݎெ௉ாீ  ݎெ௉ாீ ൌ ܣ ൅	ඥܣଶ ൅	ሺܧሺ݁݌ݏ୲ାଶሻ െ	ሺܧሺ݁݌ݏ୲ାଵሻሻ/ ଴ܲ 
ܣ ൌ ܧሺ݀݌ݏ୲ାଵሻ/2 ୲ܲ 
ܣ ൌ 12	൬ߛ െ 1 ൅
݀݌ݏ୲ାଵ
଴ܲ
൰ 	and	 
݀݌ݏ௧ = dividends per share at the period t. ߛ = the rate of growth in abnormal earnings post forecast 
horizon. In implementing the model, ߛ is equal to the 
risk-free rate less 3%, where the 3 % represents 
economy-wide growth. 
The Economy-wide growth model 
(Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 
2005) 
ݎை௃ே 
ݎை௃ே
ൌ ܣ
൅	
ۣ
ളളള
ളളള
ളളള
ളለ ܣଶ ൅ ൬݁݌ݏ௧ାଵ
௧ܲ
൰ ൈ
ቐ
݁݌ݏ௧ାଷ െ ݁݌ݏ௧ାଶ݁݌ݏ௧ାଶ ൅
݁݌ݏ௧ାହ െ ݁݌ݏ௧ାସ݁݌ݏ௧ାସ
2 െ ሺߛ െ 1ሻቑ
 
The modified economy-wide 
growth model (Gode and 
Mohanram, 2003) 
ீݎ ெ 
ݎை௃ே
ൌ ܣ ൅	ඨܣଶ ൅ ൬݁݌ݏ୲ାଵ
୲ܲ
൰ ൈ ሺ݁݌ݏ୲ାଶ െ ݁݌ݏ୲ାଵ݁݌ݏ୲ାଵ െ ሺߛ െ 1ሻሻ 
 
Mean implied cost of equity 
capital ݎ௠௘௔௡ 
The average of ݎ௉ாீ, ݎெ௉ாீ, ݎை௃ே	and ீݎ ெ. 
 
This figure shows the implied cost of equity proxies that are used as robustness to the IndEP measure. It 
includes the proxy name, symbol and the formula that used to measure it. 
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Figure 2  
The mean of IndEP over years 2005-2011 
 
The figure shows the average cost of equity, measured by industry adjusted earnings price ratio, per year from 
the period of 2005 to 2011. This period is classified into three sub-periods; the pre-crisis period (2005, 2006, 
2007), the crisis period (2008-2009) and the recovery period (2010-2011). 
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Table 1 
Panel A: Number of firms per industry for each year  
Industry Year Total Percent 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Automobiles and Parts 3 3 2 2 1 0 1 12 0.28 
Basic Resources 14 16 21 23 28 24 36 162 3.84 
Chemicals 14 13 14 16 12 9 11 89 2.11 
Construction and Materials 30 28 29 30 25 19 22 183 4.34 
Food and Beverage 26 24 25 25 26 23 24 173 4.11 
Health Care 26 24 30 32 34 33 32 211 5.01 
Industrial Goods and Services 184 192 199 196 202 194 189 1,356 32.18 
Media 40 44 41 45 38 46 47 301 7.14 
Oil & Gas 22 23 25 30 28 22 26 176 4.18 
Personal and Household Goods 50 45 46 46 38 34 39 298 7.07 
Retail 57 52 38 39 37 34 36 293 6.95 
Technology 78 78 84 81 76 72 71 540 12.81 
Telecommunications 7 8 8 12 12 8 9 64 1.52 
Travel and Leisure 54 51 55 53 50 47 46 356 8.45 
Total 605 601 617 630 607 565 589 4,214 100 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics on earnings quality proxies and Firm Characteristics, 2005-2011 
 Mean S.D Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Accruals quality (AQ)  0.084 0.078 0.007 0.035 0.059 0.103 0.275 
Persistence 0.316 0.464 -0.948 -0.003 0.287 0.610 1.650 
Predictability 0.735 0.338 0.002 0.030 0.074 0.188 2.579 
Smoothness 1.122 0.765 0.159 0.708 1.034 1.378 2.163 
Total Assets (£mils)  1,633 5,100 2.665 34.97 127.44 622.80 33,195 
Size (log of total assets) 11.3 2.379 6.328 9.575 11.030 12.804 17.32 
Market Value (£mils) 748.6 4,001 1.37 22.44 107 551.6 24,855 
Sales (£mils)  1,260 3,432 0 31.50 140.60 654 21,053 
Growth  0.577 1.078 -2.813 -0.111 0.449 1.133 1. 50 
Leverage  0.182 0.149 0.000 0.007 0.137 0.277 0.587 
Beta (CAPM)  0.889 0.687 -0.578 0.413 0.821 1.287 2.051 
IndEP 0.036 0.091 -0.056 -0.011 0.009 0.046 0.512 
Earning-Price Ratio 0.099 0.093 0.008 0.050 0.070 0.111 0.588 
σሺCFOሻ 33.74 69.80 0.20 1.20 3.70 14.70 301 
ߪሺSalesሻ 153.2 243.2 0 3.6 15.6 87.3 789.2 
OperCycle 4.8 0.715 2.639 4.4 4.8 5.2 6.6 
NegEarn 1.8 2.1 0 0 3 6 8 
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Panel C: Correlation among earnings quality proxies  
  IndEP AQ Persist Predict Smooth Beta Size leverage 
IndEP 1 
AQ 0.09 1 
 <.0001        
Persistence 0.0662 0.0818 1 
 <.0001 <.0001       
Predictability 0.0973 0.034 0.1084 1 
 <.0001 0.0021 <.0001      
Smoothness 0.0321 0.0612 0.193 0.2696 1 
 0.0206 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001     
Beta 0.0486 0.0048 -0.0051 0.1058 0.0597 1 
 0.0005 0.6658 0.6462 <.0001 <.0001    
Size -0.0747 -0.4656 -0.1625 0.3085 -0.1112 0.1585 1 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   
Leverage 0.12 -0.0394 0.015 0.1857 0.0374 0.0257 0.1645 1 
 <.0001 0.0010 0.2122 <.0001 <.0001 0.0344 <.0001  
Growth 0.0206 0.0624 -0.1027 -0.1756 -0.1561 -0.0009 0.0784 0.1357 
 0.1793 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9410 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Panel D: Mean IndEP values by each earnings quality quintiles 
 High    Low Diff t-stat Q1 Q3 Q5 Q7 Q10 Q10-Q1 
AQ 
IndEP 0.0239 0.0289 0.0341 0.0392 0.0631 0.0392 5.66*** 
Persistence 
IndEP 0.0215 0.0346 0.0365 0.0361 0.0367 0.0152 2.94*** 
Predictability 
IndEP 0.0243 0.0318 0.0273 0.0316 0.0741 0.0498 6.21*** 
Smoothness 
IndEP 0.0409 0.0252 0.0325 0.0384 0.0345 -0.0064 1.20 
 
Sample description and variable definitions: The sample comprises firms with data on all four earnings proxies 
in a given year t, t= 4,214 firm-year observations over 2005-2011 (14 industries). Size = log of total assets in 
year t; Market value = market value of equity in year t. Leverage = total interest bearing debt divided by total 
assets in year t; Growth = log of 1 plus the percentage change in the book value of equity over the preceding 5 
years; Beta (CAPM) = 5-year rolling data acquired from firm-specific CAPM estimations using monthly data; it 
requires a firm to have at least 20 monthly observations; IndEP = the earnings–price ratio of a firm less the 
median earnings–price ratio of its industry. σሺCFOሻ = the standard deviation of operating cash flow of a firm 
computed over the preceding 10 years, σሺSalesሻ = the standard deviation of net revenue of a firm computed 
over the preceding 10 years, OperCycle = the log of operating cycle of a firm in year t, NegEarn = the number 
of years that a firm reported net income < 0 out of the preceding 10 years. 
 
Panel C shows the Pearson correlations, significance levels are shown in italics. 
 
Panel D shows the mean industry-adjusted earnings–price ratio (IndEP) for each EQ proxy quintile. The column 
labelled Diff (Q10-Q1) show the difference in the mean values of IndEP between the poor (Q10) and high (Q1) 
earnings quality quintiles, plus t-statistics test of whether the difference is zero. 
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Table 2 
Regressions of IndEP on each earning quality proxy (decile rank) and control variables 
 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Beta 0.019 0.011*** 0.019 0.011*** 0.018 0.0096*** 0.019 0.011*** 
 (1.16) (3.92) (1.18) (3.90) (1.11) (3.46) (1.19) (3.96) 
Size -0.0055** -0.0042*** -0.0061** -0.0045*** -0.0078*** -0.0065*** -0.0065** -0.0050*** 
 (-2.24) (-6.26) (-2.39) (-6.78) (-2.83) (-9.60) (-2.50) (-7.56) 
Growth -0.0021** 0.0021 -0.00073 0.0035*** 0.00035 0.0046*** -0.0010 0.0030*** 
 (-2.11) (1.44) (-0.84) (2.31) (0.37) (3.13) (-1.05) (2.03) 
Leverage 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.072*** 0.077*** 0.076* 0.078*** 0.076*** 
 (2.76) (7.12) (2.66) (6.63) (2.72) (7.04) (2.74) (7.03) 
Earnings quality 
AQ  
 
0.0024*** 
 
0.0017*** 
      
 (5.45) (2.93)       
Persistence    0.0014*** 0.0018***     
   (3.19) (3.82)     
Predictability      0.0035*** 0.0040***   
     (6.46) (7.12)   
Smoothness        0.00080** 0.00070 
       (2.23) (1.51) 
Intercept 0.061** 0.052*** 0.073*** 0.054** 0.081*** 0.065*** 0.080*** 0.065*** 
 (2.49) (5.44) (2.65) (6.15) (2.88) (8.05) (2.95) (7.48) 
N 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 
R2 0.076 0.026 0.075 0.027 0.087 0.036 0.072 0.024 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1.  
The sample consists of 4,214 firm-year observations covers the years 2005 to 2011. IndEP = the earnings–price ratio of a firm less the median earnings–price ratio of its 
industry; Beta (CAPM) = 5-year rolling data acquired from firm-specific CAPM estimations using monthly data; it requires a firm to have at least 20 monthly observations; 
Size = log of total assets in year t; Growth = log of 1 plus the percentage change in the book value of equity over the preceding 5 years; Leverage = total interest bearing debt 
divided by total assets in year t. 
 
Column 1 shows the mean annual regressions of IndEP on the decile rank value of each EQ proxy plus control variables. t-statistics, in parentheses, is based on the time 
series standard errors of the seven yearly coefficient estimates. 
Column 2 shows the pooled regressions of IndEP on the decile rank value of each EQ proxy plus control variables.
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Table 3 
Panel A: Means annual regressions of IndEP on the innate and discretionary earnings quality 
proxy (decile rank), with control variables (Method 1) 
 IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
Beta 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.020 
 (1.20) (1.16) (1.14) (1.19) 
Size -0.0014 -0.0053** -0.0067*** -0.0070*** 
 (-0.64) (-2.17) (-2.60) (-2.69) 
Growth -0.0020 -0.00052 -0.00048 -0.00091 
 (-1.57) (-0.74) (-0.54) (-0.95) 
Leverage 0.081*** 0.069** 0.075*** 0.073** 
 (2.76) (2.49) (2.58) (2.55) 
AQ (Innate) 0.0064***    
 (6.65)    
AQ (Disc.) 0.0022***    
 (3.67)    
Persistence (Innate)  0.0027***   
  (3.92)   
Persistence (Disc.)  0.0010**   
  (2.05)   
Predictability (Innate)   0.0059***  
   (4.78)  
Predictability (Disc.)   0.0037**  
   (2.23)  
Smoothness (Innate)    0.0022*** 
    (4.24) 
Smoothness (Disc.)    -0.000041 
    (-0.082) 
Intercept -0.020 0.053** 0.038 0.081*** 
 (-1.13) (2.21) (1.32) (3.06) 
N 3,527 3,527 3,527 3,527 
R2 0.092 0.085 0.094 0.082 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
The sample contains 3,527 firm-year observations over t = 2005-2011. IndEP = the earnings–price ratio of a firm less 
the median earnings–price ratio of its industry; Beta (CAPM) = 5-year rolling data acquired from firm-specific 
CAPM estimations using monthly data; it requires a firm to have at least 20 monthly observations; Size = log of 
total assets in year t; Growth = log of 1 plus the percentage change in the book value of equity over the 
preceding 5 years; Leverage = total interest bearing debt divided by total assets in year t; Innate = the innate 
component of earnings quality proxy; Disc.= the discretionary component of earnings quality proxy. 
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Table 4 
Pooled regressions of IndEP on each earnings quality proxy (decile rank), the interaction 
between earnings quality and crisis, with control variables 
 IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
Beta 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 
 (5.32) (5.23) (4.78) (5.35) 
Size -0.0047*** -0.0051*** -0.0068*** -0.0055*** 
 (-7.15) (-7.81) (-10.2) (-8.59) 
Growth -0.0020 -0.00046 0.00046 -0.0010 
 (-1.43) (-0.33) (0.33) (-0.74) 
Leverage 0.078*** 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 
 (7.64) (7.07) (7.44) (7.52) 
Crisis 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 
 (6.84) (6.34) (6.90) (7.32) 
Recovery 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 
 (3.66) (3.66) (4.42) (5.30) 
AQ 0.0026***    
 (4.66)    
AQ * Crisis 0.011***    
 (15.5)    
AQ * Recovery 0.0050***    
 (8.76)    
Persistence  0.0051***   
  (11.2)   
Persist * Crisis  0.0078***   
  (15.5)   
Persist * Recovery  0.0033***   
  (9.20)   
Predictability   0.0062***  
   (12.12)  
Predict * Crisis   0.0098***  
   (16.4)  
Predict * Recovery   0.0043***  
   (8.32)  
Smoothness    0.0035*** 
    (7.32) 
Smooth * Crisis    0.010*** 
    (15.6) 
Smooth * Recovery    0.0042*** 
    (8.13) 
Intercept 0.037*** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 
 (4.23) (5.49) (6.75) (5.99) 
N 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 
adj. R2 0.124 0.125 0.129 0.120 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
The sample contains 4,214 firm-year observations over t = 2005-2011. IndEP = the earnings–price ratio of a firm less 
the median earnings–price ratio of its industry; Beta (CAPM) = 5-year rolling data acquired from firm-specific 
CAPM estimations using monthly data; it requires a firm to have at least 20 monthly observations; Size = log of 
total assets in year t; Growth = log of 1 plus the percentage change in the book value of equity over the 
preceding 5 years; Leverage = total interest bearing debt divided by total assets in year t.  Crisis is a dummy 
variable equals 1 if years are 2008 and 2009 and the rest equals zero; ܴ݁ܿ݋ݒ݁ݎݕ is a dummy variable equals 1 if years are 
2010 and 2011 and the rest equals zero. 
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Table 5 
Pooled regressions of IndEP on the innate and discretionary earnings quality proxy (decile 
rank) (decile rank), the interaction between those components and crisis, with control variables 
 IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
Beta 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (5.33) (4.89) (4.77) (4.91) 
Size -0.0011 -0.0047*** -0.0059*** -0.0061*** 
 (-0.88) (-5.57) (-7.61) (-8.37) 
Growth -0.0020 -0.00040 -0.00080 -0.0010 
 (-1.17) (-0.23) (-0.48) (-0.61) 
Leverage 0.078*** 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 
 (6.92) (5.80) (6.44) (6.16) 
Crisis 0.027** 0.017** 0.012 0.042*** 
 (2.01) (1.99) (0.36) (4.11) 
Recovery -0.0028 -0.0069 -0.0097 0.020** 
 (-0.27) (-1.03) (-0.26) (2.45) 
AQ (Innate) 0.0033***    
 (2.84)    
AQ (Disc.) 0.00025    
 (0.41)    
AQ (Innate) * Crisis 0.0053***    
 (2.92)    
AQ (Disc.) * Crisis 0.0022    
 (1.34)    
AQ (Innate) * Recovery 0.0029**    
 (1.99)    
AQ (Disc.) * Recovery 0.0030**    
 (2.21)    
Persistence (Innate)  0.00087*   
  (1.69)   
Persistence (Disc.)  0.000047   
  (0.11)   
Persistence (Innate) * Crisis  0.0061***   
  (3.39)   
Persistence (Disc.) * Crisis  0.0033**   
  (2.53)   
Persistence (Innate) * Recovery  0.0053***   
  (3.71)   
Persistence (Disc.) * Recovery  0.0018*   
  (1.95)   
Predictability (Innate)   0.0020**  
   (2.17)  
Predictability (Disc.)   0.0018*  
   (1.89)  
Predictability (Innate) * Crisis   0.0075**  
   (2.36)  
Predictability (Disc.) * Crisis   0.0029  
   (0.88)  
Predictability (Innate) * Recovery   0.0046*  
   (1.68)  
Predictability (Disc.) * Recovery   0.0026  
   (0.72)  
Smoothness (Innate)    0.00017 
    (0.25) 
Smoothness (Disc.)    -0.00022 
    (-0.43) 
Smoothness (Innate) * Crisis    0.0035** 
    (2.04) 
Smoothness (Disc.) * Crisis    0.00095 
    (0.70) 
Smoothness (Innate) * Recovery    0.0032** 
    (2.30) 
Smoothness (Disc.) * Recovery    -0.0012 
    (-1.12) 
Intercept -0.022 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.057*** 
 (-1.09) (4.06) (2.77) (5.75) 
N 3,527 3,527 3,527 3,527 
adj. R2 0.131 0.134 0.131 0.125 
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*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
The sample contains 3,527 firm-year observations over t = 2005-2011. IndEP = the earnings–price ratio of a firm less 
the median earnings–price ratio of its industry; Beta (CAPM) = 5-year rolling data acquired from firm-specific 
CAPM estimations using monthly data; it requires a firm to have at least 20 monthly observations; Size = log of 
total assets in year t; Growth = log of 1 plus the percentage change in the book value of equity over the 
preceding 5 years; Leverage = total interest bearing debt divided by total assets in year t.  Crisis is a dummy 
variable equals 1 if years are 2008 and 2009 and the rest equals zero; ܴ݁ܿ݋ݒ݁ݎݕ is a dummy variable equals 1 if years are 
2010 and 2011 and the rest equals zero, Innate = the innate component of earnings quality proxy; Disc.= the 
discretionary component of earnings quality proxy. 
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Table 6 
Panel A: Means annual regressions of Easton model and Modified Easton model on each earnings quality proxy (decile rank), with control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ݎ௉ாீ  ݎ௉ாீ  ݎ௉ாீ  ݎ௉ாீ  ݎெ௉ாீ  ݎெ௉ாீ  ݎெ௉ாீ  ݎெ௉ாீ  Beta 0.0025*** 0.0027*** 0.0025*** 0.0026*** 0.0025*** 0.0027*** 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 
 (4.87) (5.54) (5.59) (5.13) (4.73) (5.32) (5.36) (4.91) 
Size -0.0020*** -0.0023*** -0.0025*** -0.0023*** -0.0020*** -0.0023*** -0.0025*** -0.0023*** 
 (-5.87) (-6.85) (-6.80) (-6.80) (-5.94) (-6.87) (-6.77) (-6.78) 
Growth -0.00051* -0.00027 -0.00018 -0.00021 -0.00055* -0.00031 -0.00022 -0.00026 
 (-2.06) (-1.01) (-0.70) (-0.81) (-2.29) (-1.16) (-0.86) (-1.01) 
Leverage 0.0096*** 0.0090*** 0.0092*** 0.0094*** 0.0094*** 0.0088*** 0.0090*** 0.0092*** 
 (4.34) (3.97) (4.04) (4.01) (4.67) (4.29) (4.34) (4.30) 
AQ 0.00061***    0.00061***    
 (8.74)    (10.4)    
Persistence  0.00023**    0.00024**   
  (2.94)    (2.54)   
Predictability   0.00036***    0.00037***  
   (4.35)    (4.20)  
Smoothness    0.00032***    0.00029*** 
    (5.54)    (6.14) 
Intercept 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 
 (7.59) (9.55) (9.32) (9.07) (7.61) (9.49) (9.17) (8.88) 
N 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,781 3,781 3,781 3,781 
R2 0.152 0.138 0.140 0.140 0.152 0.139 0.140 0.140 
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Panel B: Means annual regressions of the economy-wide growth model, the modified the economy-wide growth model and the mean of the four cot of 
equity capital proxies on each earnings quality proxy (decile rank), with control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ݎ௢௝௡ ݎ௢௝௡ ݎ௢௝௡ ݎ௢௝௡ ீݎ ெ ீݎ ெ ீݎ ெ ீݎ ெ rMean rMean rMean rMean 
Beta 0.00030 0.00031 0.00031 0.00030 0.0020*** 0.0022*** 0.0020*** 0.0021*** 0.0022*** 0.0024*** 0.0022*** 0.0023*** 
 (1.40) (1.43) (1.53) (1.44) (4.21) (4.66) (4.70) (4.39) (4.44) (5.09) (5.02) (4.76) 
Size -0.00063*** -0.00068*** -0.00072*** -0.00069*** -0.0019*** -0.0022*** -0.0023*** -0.0022*** -0.0021*** -0.0024*** -0.0026*** -0.0024*** 
 (-4.73) (-4.91) (-4.57) (-4.93) (-5.51) (-6.27) (-6.09) (-6.23) (-6.28) (-7.37) (-7.10) (-7.24) 
Growth 0.000047 0.00012* 0.00011** 0.00012* -0.00051** -0.00028 -0.00023 -0.00025 -0.00051* -0.00026 -0.00017 -0.00022 
 (1.00) (2.44) (2.54) (2.35) (-2.45) (-1.15) (-0.97) (-1.10) (-2.08) (-0.96) (-0.68) (-0.86) 
Leverage 0.0025** 0.0023** 0.0024** 0.0024** 0.0082*** 0.0076*** 0.0079*** 0.0080*** 0.0094*** 0.0087*** 0.0089*** 0.0091*** 
 (3.38) (3.21) (3.29) (3.11) (4.64) (4.26) (4.32) (4.28) (4.29) (4.09) (4.12) (4.17) 
AQ 0.00014***    0.00053***    0.00061***    
 (5.59)    (14.5)    (10.4)    
Persistence  0.000085**    0.00023*    0.00026**   
  (2.79)    (2.14)    (3.04)   
Predictability   0.000048    0.00031**    0.00038***  
   (1.16)    (3.02)    (4.49)  
Smoothness    0.000070*    0.00028***    0.00030*** 
    (1.96)    (5.73)    (5.43) 
Intercept 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 
 (31.4) (31.1) (28.4) (29.4) (12.1) (14.8) (13.9) (14.1) (10.00) (12.9) (11.7) (11.8) 
N 3,519 3,519 3,519 3,519 3,843 3,843 3,843 3,843 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 
R2 0.111 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.150 0.139 0.139 0.140 0.154 0.140 0.142 0.141 
 *** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
The sample ranges between 3,519 and 4,010 firm-year observations for t = 2005 to 2011. Beta (CAPM) = 5-year rolling data acquired from firm-specific CAPM estimations using 
monthly data; it requires a firm to have at least 20 monthly observations; Size = log of total assets in year t; Growth = log of 1 plus the percentage change in the book value of 
equity over the preceding 5 years; Leverage = total interest bearing debt divided by total assets in year t.   
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 Table 7 
Fixed and random panel regressions of IndEP on each earnings quality proxy (decile rank), with control variables 
 IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
 Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random 
Beta 0.014*** 0.0095*** 0.013*** 0.0093*** 0.012*** 0.0078*** 0.013*** 0.0093*** 
 (3.97) (3.69) (3.82) (3.63) (3.41) (3.07) (3.87) (3.64) 
Size 0.018*** -0.0037*** 0.020*** -0.0036*** 0.013*** -0.0061*** 0.019*** -0.0040*** 
 (3.96) (-3.35) (4.31) (-3.39) (2.75) (-5.68) (4.26) (-3.77) 
Growth -0.0044** 0.0017 -0.0042** 0.0025* -0.0023 0.0038*** -0.0042** 0.0022 
 (-2.07) (1.24) (-2.00) (1.77) (-1.09) (2.72) (-2.01) (1.60) 
Leverage 0.017 0.065*** 0.013 0.062*** 0.022 0.065*** 0.014 0.065*** 
 (0.80) (5.14) (0.60) (4.86) (1.01) (5.14) (0.67) (5.11) 
AQ 0.0018* 0.0020*       
 (1.93) (1.95)       
Persistence   0.0015* 0.0018***     
   (1.91) (3.10)     
Predictability     0.0070*** 0.0051***   
     (5.40) (7.11)   
Smoothness       0.0018** 0.0010* 
       (1.99) (1.72) 
Intercept -0.19*** 0.055*** -0.22*** 0.048*** -0.17*** 0.059*** -0.22*** 0.057*** 
 (-3.49) (4.02) (-4.08) (3.85) (-3.20) (5.08) (-4.06) (4.60) 
N 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 
Hausman  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
The sample contains 4,214 firm-year observations for t = 2005 to 2011. IndEP = the earnings–price ratio of a firm less the median earnings–price ratio of its industry; Beta (CAPM) 
= 5-year rolling data acquired from firm-specific CAPM estimations using monthly data; it requires a firm to have at least 20 monthly observations; Size = log of total assets 
in year t; Growth = log of 1 plus the percentage change in the book value of equity over the preceding 5 years; Leverage = total interest bearing debt divided by total assets in 
year t.   
 
 
 
45 
 
 
Table 8 
Means annual regressions of IndEP on the discretionary earnings quality proxy (decile rank), 
with control variables (Method 2) 
 IndEP IndEP IndEP IndEP 
Beta 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 
 (1.19) (1.21) (1.19) (1.23) 
Size -0.0069* -0.0077* -0.0092** -0.0078* 
 (-2.07) (-2.26) (-2.66) (-2.21) 
Growth -0.0014 -0.00015 0.00060 -0.00062 
 (-1.17) (-0.17) (0.61) (-0.63) 
Leverage 0.078** 0.075** 0.076** 0.077** 
 (2.72) (2.68) (2.68) (2.71) 
σሺCFOሻ 0. 000027** 0. 000031*** 0. 000025** 0. 000030** 
 (3.33) (3.97) (3.25) (3.68) 
ߪሺSalesሻ 0.00000084 0.0000011 0.0000017 0.00000082 
 (0.38) (0.49) (0.82) (0.39) 
OperCycle -0.0041* -0.0036* -0.0039* -0.0036 
 (-2.03) (-1.95) (-2.15) (-1.92) 
NegEarn 0.0028*** 0.0031*** 0.0022** 0.0033*** 
 (4.63) (4.73) (3.47) (3.91) 
AQ (Disc.) 0.0022**    
 (3.68)    
Persistence (Disc.)  0.0012*   
  (2.11)   
Predictability (Disc.)   0.0029***  
   (5.93)  
Smoothness (Disc.)    0.00014 
    (0.24) 
Intercept 0.090** 0.10** 0.11** 0.11** 
 (2.60) (2.77) (2.99) (2.86) 
N 3,527 3,527 3,527 3,527 
R2 0.099 0.098 0.104 0.095 
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.1. t-statistics in parentheses and italic. 
The sample contains 3,527 firm-year observations over t = 2005-2011. IndEP = the earnings–price ratio of a firm less 
the median earnings–price ratio of its industry; Beta (CAPM) = 5-year rolling data acquired from firm-specific 
CAPM estimations using monthly data; it requires a firm to have at least 20 monthly observations; Size = log of 
total assets in year t; Growth = log of 1 plus the percentage change in the book value of equity over the 
preceding 5 years; Leverage = total interest bearing debt divided by total assets in year t; σሺCFOሻ = the standard 
deviation of operating cash flow of a firm computed over the preceding 10 years, σሺSalesሻ = the standard 
deviation of net revenue of a firm computed over the preceding 10 years, OperCycle = the log of operating cycle 
of a firm in year t, NegEarn = the number of years that a firm reported net income < 0 out of the preceding 10 
years; Innate = the innate component of earnings quality proxy; Disc.= the discretionary component of earnings 
quality proxy. 
